Handling Whistleblowing Reports: The Complexity of the Double Agent

Increasingly organizations have dedicated systems and personnel (recipients) to receive and handle internal whistleblower reports. Yet, the complexity of handling whistleblower reports is often underestimated, and there is a dearth of literature that attempts to describe or analyse the challenges internal recipients face. This paper uses an agency theory inspired lens to provide insight into the complexity of internal whistleblowing, with the aim to identify focal points for improving internal whistleblowing processes. We conceive of internal recipients as agents of two principals in the event of whistleblowing: owner/top management as well as whistleblowers. We identify sources of agency problems and agency costs within these double-agent relationships. We provide avenues for solving these problems and reducing the agency costs. We close by offering paths for future research.

Lees verder:

• Handling Whistleblowing Reports: The Complexity of the Double Agent door Nadia Smaili, Wim Vandekerckhove & Paulina Arroyo Pardo in Journal of Business Ethics