In 2015, it was revealed how software manipulation and emissions fraud were deeply embedded in one of the most iconic European companies, Volkswagen (VW), as well as in several other European car manufacturers (Ewing, 2017). In addition to confirming concerns about the lenient EU regulation of diesel emissions, the discovery of the fraud in the US painfully illustrated the complete absence of enforcement in the European car manufacturing industry as compared with the US. Moreover, the VW fraud provides a perfect illustration of strain (Agnew, 1992), as Volkswagen did not have the technical ability to manufacture a ‘clean’ diesel engine that was at the same time attractive enough to survive in a competitive global market.

The VW diesel fraud is only one example of European corporate crimes that raises questions about the relationship between the globalization of markets and corporate crime in Europe (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). In the case of Volkswagen, globalization seems to have played a role both in the commission of crimes – because increased global competition provided a motive to deceive consumers and regulators – as well as in its detection – it was enforcement by the US Environmental Protection Agency that brought the fraud to the light and led to inquiries in Europe as well.

Other recent cases suggest different causal paths. Creative tax compliance by US companies such as Starbucks and Apple, headquartered in EU countries, suggests that European governments are willing to offer sweetheart deals to US companies. Here, EU member states withstand EU legislation on state aid and reveal how what is interpreted as illegal in Brussels is viewed as beneficial by the Irish, Dutch and UK governments. Criminologists have long since found such legal and moral ambiguities conducive to corporate behaviour that benefits from legal loopholes and a lack of societal condemnation (Pearce, 1976; Passas,, 1990; Nelken 2012; Pontell et al., 2014; Whyte, 2014). This may be expected to increase should Brexit and increased competition from the UK for international business occur.

As a third example, the 2013 horsemeat and 2018 Fipronil egg food scandals reveal how European common markets create transnational risk as contaminated food products travel within the common market. Here, open borders between EU states create opportunities for exchange between European businesses, but, with coordination problems in enforcement, risk in one country can rapidly spread in other European states. This problem is not unique for food production: the common market also allows for the free flow of labour, offering businesses in north-west Europe the opportunity to import cheap labour from the European east and south, creating openings for the exploitation of cheap labour and the avoidance of social benefits and endangering the promise of a prosperous and equal social market economy in the EU.

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